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             PERSPECTIVES ON FISHER V. 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AND THE 
STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD IN 
THE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
CONTEXT 
 
Michael Poreda* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This term, the United States Supreme Court will weigh in 
again on the constitutionality of race-conscious college 
admissions in a case called Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin. This issue was last addressed in 2003 in the twin cases 
of Grutter v. Bollinger1 and Gratz v. Bollinger.2 In Gratz v. 
Bollinger, the Court held 6-3 that it was unconstitutional for a 
university to assign a pre-determined point value to an 
applicant based on minority status alone.3 In the more critical 
case Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held by a 5-4 majority that 
the holistic and individualized consideration of race during 
the admissions process is narrowly tailored to meet a 
university’s compelling interest in assembling a diverse student 
body.4 
The University of Texas, which the Fifth Circuit had 
previously banned from considering the race of its applicants 
in Hopwood v. Texas,5 implemented a new admission program 
following Grutter that took limited consideration of the race 
 
   * B.A., Rutgers University—New Brunswick, 2003; M.A., Teachers College—
Columbia University, 2005; J.D., Seton Hall University, 2010. Mr. Poreda practices civil 
rights and education litigation at Methfessel & Werbel in Edison, New Jersey. He is 
the co-author of the New York City Bar Association’s amicus brief in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin. He thanks the members of the City Bar’s Committee on 
Education & the Law and Committee on Civil Rights who read his drafts and offered 
helpful comments. 
 1 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 2 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 3 Id. at 270. 
 4 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
 5 Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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of some of its applicants.6 Before Grutter overruled Hopwood, 
the University of Texas had preserved racial diversity on 
campus through its Top Ten Percent Plan, which admitted all 
Texas applicants ranked in the top ten percent of their high 
school classes. Although this plan reduced the university’s 
ability to be truly selective with its student body, the racial 
imbalance of Texas’s geographical regions assured the 
university that this plan would prevent a precipitous drop in 
the university’s population of black and Hispanic students in 
the wake of Hopwood.7 Since Grutter, the University of Texas 
has continued to use the Top Ten Percent Plan, under which 
60 to 80 percent of undergraduates are admitted, but it also has 
included race as one of many relevant factors in its second-tier 
admissions process, which consists of a more traditional 
individualized assessment of an applicant’s academic and 
personal merits.8 In this second-tier process, the race of some 
applicants receives limited consideration.9 
Although Grutter held that race-conscious admissions were 
acceptable, it still encouraged experimentation with race-
neutral alternatives like the Top Ten Percent Plan. Ironically, it 
is the University of Texas’ experimental hybridization of the 
race-neutral Top Ten Percent Plan and the race-conscious 
second-tier plan that became the fodder for the Fisher case. 
PetitionerAbigail Fisher, a white student who was not in the 
top ten percent of her high school class and was not admitted,10 
claims that the University of Texas used “racial classifications” 
in a way that violated her right to equal protection under the 
laws. 
By way of background, all government uses of “racial 
classifications” are subject to “strict scrutiny review” under the 
Equal Protection Clause. The strict scrutiny analysis that the 
Court applies to racial classifications requires the university to 
prove that any racial classification is “narrowly tailored” to 
 
 6 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 7 See Brief for Respondent at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 
(5th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-345). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 10–11. See Fisher, 631 F.3d  at 227. 
 10 Fisher has since graduated from another college. See Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 7, at 17. 
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meet a compelling interest.11 The Court’s language describing 
strict scrutiny as a “most exacting” standard under which all 
ambiguities must be construed against the government12 
suggests that few racial classifications could withstand it. 
Various decisions have fashioned tests aimed at “ferreting out” 
any loose threads in the racial classification’s “narrowly 
tailoring” to a “compelling state interest.”13 Notably, cases 
reviewed under strict scrutiny require the serious examination 
of race-neutral alternatives before concluding that a racial 
classification is narrowly tailored.14 Although race-conscious 
admissions have been justified by a compelling interest in 
campus diversity—though Grutter stated that race-conscious 
admissions must eventually come to an end15—the petitioner in 
Fisher has attacked the university’s hybrid race-neutral/race-
conscious scheme for achieving campus diversity on two 
grounds.16 First, she argues that the Top Ten Percent Plan was 
so successful at producing campus diversity that it eliminated 
the compelling interest warranting race-conscious admissions.17 
Second, she argues that the use of race is not narrowly tailored 
for several reasons, including the fact that race only enters the 
admissions equation under very limited circumstances. 
In spite of these arguments, it seems virtually certain that 
the University of Texas’s plan does comply with the mandates 
of Grutter. Even Judge Garza of the Fifth Circuit, whose 
concurring opinion harshly criticized Grutter and the very 
institution of race-conscious admissions itself, conceded that 
the University of Texas’s program was constitutional within 
the existing Grutter standard.18 
The university’s brief very deftly deflates each of the 
petitioner’s arguments and sub-arguments, except for the 
 
 11 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 12 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978); see also Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 (2007). 
 13 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 500 (2005). See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
 14 See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989); Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 704 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339). 
 15 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
 16 Id. at 328–33. 
 17 Brief for Petitioner at 35–36, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (No.11-345). 
 18 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247. 
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petitioner’s last argument, which may be the most important in 
asking the Court to reconsider its holding in Grutter.19 
The university’s counterargument was simply that stare 
decisis concerns should prevent an overturning of Grutter.20 
While stare decisis is a valid argument, it does not go to the 
core of the problem. The petitioner has challenged Grutter on 
a fundamental level. Specifically, the petitioner argues that 
Grutter erred by giving universities a level of good faith 
deference in their implementation of race-conscious 
admissions.21 True strict scrutiny, the petitioner argues, 
tolerates no such deference.22 What is more, it is somewhat 
difficult to believe that the Court would have granted 
certiorari in this case unless it considered overruling Grutter in 
some respects, although the use of race at the University of 
Texas is substantially more limited than it was in the 
University of Michigan Law School (“Michigan Law School”) 
process held constitutional in Grutter. Furthermore, the 
petitioner’s arguments about the application of Grutter are not 
terribly convincing, except for the one that attacks Grutter’s 
interpretation of strict scrutiny itself. 
This Article explores ways that the University might have 
handled this most pressing question more fundamentally than 
appealing to an interest in stare decisis. Part II reviews the basic 
standard for the constitutional use of race-conscious 
admissions, as developed through the main race-conscious 
admissions cases, as well as other Equal Protection cases. The 
rest of the Article explores fundamental approaches to 
overcoming the plaintiff’s arguments about strict scrutiny. 
Part III addresses whether the University’s use of race in the 
admissions process is even a “racial classification” warranting 
Equal Protection review in the first place. Part IV explores the 
possibility that universities have a compelling interest in a 
transparent student selection process, which cannot possibly 
occur without the use of race. Part V argues that strict scrutiny 
itself is context-sensitive and flexible and that the Court 
should officially recognize that the rigidity of strict scrutiny 
 
 19 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 53. 
 20 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 50–54. 
 21 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 53–57. 
 22 Id. at 54 (citations omitted). 
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should be subject to slackening in certain contexts. 
II. BASIC STANDARD: RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS 
PROCESSES THAT DO NOT INSULATE MINORITIES FROM 
COMPETITION WITH ALL OTHER CANDIDATES ARE 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
In a series of three cases, Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, Gratz v. Bollinger, and Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the Supreme Court has specified what does and does 
not constitute an acceptable use of race in the university 
admissions process.23 In these cases, the Court forbade 
universities from conferring discrete benefits based solely on 
race but permitted universities to holistically consider the race 
of applicants, so long as race was not considered in a way that 
insulated minorities from competition with all other 
candidates.24 
In University of California v. Bakke, the Court held that 
setting aside a certain number of seats in a class for minority 
students violated the Equal Protection Clause.25 In Gratz v. 
Bollinger, the Court forbade the University of Michigan from 
giving undergraduate candidates twenty points—one-fifth of 
the points needed to earn admission—just for being 
minorities.26 This automatic award assured admission for 
virtually every minimally qualified minority applicant.27 While 
the holdings in Bakke and Gratz specified what a university 
could not do when considering an applicant’s race, these cases 
also made it clear that universities can constitutionally use race 
as a “plus factor” in the admissions process.28 Grutter v. 
Bollinger’s importance lay in its incorporation of the 
constitutionality of considering race as a “plus factor” into its 
holding.29 
Using the factor of race, among other factors, is critical to 
 
 23 Grutter and Gratz were decided together on June 23, 2003. 
 24 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
 25 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266–67. 
 26 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003). 
 27 Id. at 266, 272. 
 28 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295. 
 29 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391–92. 
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a school’s right to assemble a heterogeneous student body.30 
The key to the constitutional use of race is that it must not 
“insulate the individual from comparison with all other 
candidates for the available seats.”31 A program is constitutional 
where it “treats each applicant as an individual in the 
admissions process.”32 As the Court in Grutter stated, “The 
importance of this individualized consideration in the context 
of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.”33 
In Bakke, the plaintiff was a white applicant to the 
University of California—Davis medical school who was 
denied admission.34 He argued that the medical school had 
violated his rights to equal protection because it did not 
consider his application for the sixteen seats that were reserved 
for members of disadvantaged minority groups.35 The Court 
agreed that the medical school had a racial quota, which it held 
unconstitutional.36 
In the Bakke opinion, Justice Powell used the example of 
Harvard College to illustrate a constitutional race-conscious 
admissions process—an example which would later influence 
Grutter and Gratz. At Harvard, the admissions officials were 
allowed to consider racial and ethnic background, among other 
factors that would help contribute to a diverse student body, 
the definition of “diversity” being necessarily fluid.37 Race 
could “tip” a decision just as “geographic origin” or a “life 
spent on a farm.”38 Being a member of a minority group does 
not necessarily become “decisive” to the decision.39 An Italian-
American would still be chosen over an African-American if 
the Italian-American had overall qualities that would be more 
likely to promote “educational pluralism.”40 Ultimately, “[t]he 
applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another 
 
 30 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
 31 Id. at 317. 
 32 Id. at 318. 
 33 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 34 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. 
 35 Id. at 277–78. 
 36 Id. at 266. 
 37 Id. at 316. 
 38 Id. at 323. 
 39 Id. at 317. 
 40 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318. 
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candidate receiving a ‘plus’ on the basis of ethnic background 
will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that 
seat simply because he was not the right color or had the 
wrong surname.”41 No goals or quotas existed for the number 
of racial minorities to be admitted, but Harvard did keep track 
of the numbers of admitted students in various categories.42 
In a similar vein, the Harvard program was constitutional 
because it did not make incorrect assumptions about a person 
based on race alone. Although the constitutionality of the 
Harvard program was not at stake in Bakke, the Harvard 
program became the model of acceptable race-conscious 
admissions as the standard against which the University of 
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program was ruled 
unconstitutional in Gratz.43 The unconstitutionality of the 
undergraduate University of Michigan program was rooted 
not only in its failure to expose minority applicants to holistic 
review, but in its incorrect assumption that a minority 
student’s race alone brought some predetermined, quantifiable 
measure of diversity to the school.44 In her concurring 
opinion, Justice O’Connor emphasized that what made the 
University of Michigan’s process unconstitutional was its lack 
of “meaningful individualized review” and its automatic 
award of twenty points was given to every minority.45 
In contrast, the Michigan Law School admissions program 
held constitutional in Grutter essentially adopted the Harvard 
model: 
Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized, 
holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to 
a diverse educational environment. The Law School affords 
this individualized consideration to applicants of all races. 
 
 41 Id. at 318. 
 42 Id. at 316–17. 
 43 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–76 (2003). 
 44 See id. at 271 (stating that the Harvard plan was constitutional because it did 
not assume that a person’s race “automatically ensured a specific and identifiable 
contribution to a university’s diversity”); see also id. at 273–74 (“[T]he result of the 
automatic distribution of 20 points is that the University would never consider [a 
minority student’s] individual background, experiences, and characteristics to assess his 
individual ‘potential contribution to diversity.’ Instead, every [minority applicant] 
would simply be admitted.”). 
 45 Id. at 276. 
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There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic 
acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable. 
Unlike the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Law 
School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity 
“bonuses” based on race or ethnicity.46 
The University of Texas at issue in Fisher affords all of its 
candidates the same type of individualized review as Harvard 
College or Michigan Law School. An applicant’s race is one of 
many factors considered in a broad assessment called a 
“personal achievement score,” which is used to assess 
candidates whose merit as applicants is not fully reflected by 
their academic achievement.47 The “personal achievement 
score” includes an “applicant’s demonstrated leadership 
qualities, awards and honors, work experience, and 
involvement in extracurricular activities and community 
service.”48 Additionally, it incorporates  “a ‘special 
circumstances’ element that may reflect the socioeconomic 
status of the applicant and his or her high school, the 
applicant’s family status and family responsibilities, the 
applicant’s standardized test score compared to the average of 
her high school, and—beginning in 2004—the applicant’s 
race.”49 The use of race at the University of Texas therefore 
fits the basic parameter for a constitutional use of race because 
it requires individualized review and does not award 
candidates any discrete benefit based solely on race.In fact, the 
University of Texas’s program is even more restrained and 
prudent in its use of race than the constitutional programs in 
Bakke and Grutter, having been adjusted to address the 
concerns expressed in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent by 
assuring that “individual assessment is safeguarded through 
the entire process.”50 
 
 46 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 47 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 228 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice 
Kennedy expressed concern that race was “likely outcome determinative” in the 
decisions about who would fill the seats in the bottom fifteen to twenty percent of 
the class. Id. This concern arose because admissions officials monitored the racial 
composition of the incoming class on a “day-to-day” basis and could “recalibrate the 
plus factor given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law’s 
School’s goal of critical mass.” Id. at 392. This system of monitoring racial composition, 
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Only a minority of applicants not admitted under the 
University of Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan might have their 
race considered during the second-tier admissions process.51 In 
this second-tier process, applicants are assigned two numbers: 
an Academic Index (“AI”), and a Personal Achievement Index 
(“PAI”).52 Both scores are assigned long before officials make 
any decision about who to admit or deny.53 If the applicant’s AI 
score is high enough, the applicant is admitted based on that 
score alone.54 If the applicant’s scores are not high enough, the 
application is “presumptively denied.”55 On rare occasions, 
senior admissions staff may “designate [a presumptively 
denied] file for full review notwithstanding the AI score.”56 
The PAI, which has been in effect since 1997, was designed 
to “identify and reward students whose merit as applicants was 
not adequately reflected by their class rank and test scores.”57 
The PAI is based on three scores: one score for each of two 
required essays and a third score—the personal achievement 
score discussed above—which represents an evaluation of the 
applicant’s entire file.58 The essays are each given a score 
between one and six through “a holistic evaluation of the essay 
as a piece of writing based on its complexity of thought, 
substantiality of development, and facility with language.”59 
The personal achievement score is also based on a scale of one 
to six, although it is given slightly greater weight in the final 
PAI calculation than the mean of the two essay scores.60 
The Fifth Circuit61 explained the place of race in 
 
while not limiting the size of the plus factor, created a likelihood that “individual 
consideration” was not preserved at the end of the admission season. Id. at 389. 
 51 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227–28. 
 52 Id. at 222–23. 
 53 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 13. 
 54 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 223 (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d. 587, 591 
(W.D. Tex. 2009)). 
 58 Id. at 227. 
 59 Id. (citing Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597). 
 60 Id. at 228. 
 61 In the Fifth Circuit Fisher appeal, 631 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 2011), the 
petitioners Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz claimed that the race-conscious 
second-tier process violated their rights to equal protection by discriminating against 
them on the basis of race. 
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calculating the personal achievement score in detail, 
demonstrating that minority applicants at the University of 
Texas are not given any discrete benefit just for being a 
member of a minority group: 
None of the elements of the personal achievement score—
including race—are considered individually or given separate 
numerical values to be added together. Rather, the file is 
evaluated as a whole in order to provide the fullest possible 
understanding of the student as a person and to place his or her 
achievements in context. As UT’s director of admissions 
explained, “race provides—like [the] language [spoken in the 
applicant’s home], whether or not someone is the first in their 
family to attend college, and family responsibilities—important 
context in which to evaluate applicants, and is only one aspect 
of the diversity that the University seeks to attain.” Race is 
considered as part of the applicant’s context whether or not the 
applicant belongs to a minority group, and so—at least in 
theory—it “can positively impact applicants of all races, 
including Caucasian[s], or [it] may have no impact whatsoever.” 
Moreover, given the mechanics of UT’s admissions process, 
race has the potential to influence only a small part of the 
applicant’s overall admissions score. The sole instance when 
race is considered is as one element of the personal 
achievement score, which itself is only a part of the total PAI. 
Without a sufficiently high AI and well-written essays, an 
applicant with even the highest personal achievement score 
will still be denied admission.62 
Perhaps most importantly, the University of Texas does not 
keep a running tally of the racial composition of its incoming 
class.63 Thus, at the end of each admissions cycle, University of 
Texas officials will not inflate the size of the “plus” factor 
given to race in an effort to meet a particular racial goal. This 
eliminates the fear, expressed by Justice Kennedy in his dissent 
in Grutter, that candidates at the bottom of the admitted class 
will be selected solely, or almost solely, based on their race.64 
 
 62 Id. at 228–29 (citations omitted). 
 63 Id. at 236 (“[D]emographics are not consulted as part of any individual 
admissions decision, and UT’s admissions procedures do not treat certain racial groups 
or minorities differently than others when reviewing individual applications.”). 
 64 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389–93 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Accordingly, the University’s first argument in its brief is 
that its race-conscious admissions plan conforms closely to the 
dictates of the prior case law.65 But compliance with prior case 
law may not be what the Court is going to scrutinize in this 
case. The Supreme Court may well evaluate whether the 
underlying decision in Grutter was actually constitutional. If 
that is what the Supreme Court intends to do, then Fisher calls 
for more fundamental arguments about Equal Protection. 
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS DOES NOT EMPLOY “RACIAL 
CLASSIFICATIONS” SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW 
Throughout the course of the Fisher litigation, the parties 
and courts have taken for granted that the plaintiff stated an 
Equal Protection claim by virtue of the University’s use of 
“racial classifications.” All governmental uses of “racial 
classifications” are subject to “strict scrutiny review” under the 
Equal Protection Clause.66 There is an argument to be made, 
however, that the University of Texas did not use “racial 
classifications” warranting strict scrutiny review. 
The Supreme Court has never defined what a “racial 
classification” is, and this case presents an opportunity for the 
pinning down of the contours of a definition. There are two 
possible definitions that could have been argued by the 
University of Texas. First, the University of Texas could have 
argued that a racial classification is a discrete, automatic action 
based solely on race that does not take consideration of any of 
the individual or attending circumstances.  Virtually every 
previous case would tolerate such a definition, except possibly 
Grutter where it might contend with the Court’s assumption 
that racial classifications existed at Michigan Law School in 
Grutter. However, the University could have argued for a 
second, slightly wider definition of racial classifications, 
which would have accommodated Grutter but still result in a 
victory for the University of Texas: a government action that 
entails a risk that race could become the predominant factor in 
any admissions decision. 
 
 
 65 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 23. 
 66 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). 
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A. “Racial Classifications” as Racial Preferences or Discrete 
Actions Based Solely on Race 
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly defined 
“racial classification,” the First Circuit provides some 
guidance.67 In Raso v. Lago, the court held that an affirmative 
action clause attached to a company’s receipt of federal funds 
for the construction of a housing development was not a racial 
classification warranting review under the Equal Protection 
Clause.68 The affirmative action clause required the recipient 
of federal construction funds to actively encourage minorities 
to purchase homes in the development through “mailings to 
minority organizations, assurances of nondiscrimination, and 
like measures . . . but it did not require the developer to prefer 
members of minority races.”69 The court explained that the 
term “racial classification” normally “refers to a governmental 
standard, preferentially favorable to one race or another, for 
the distribution of benefits.”70 
That a racial classification is tantamount to a “racial 
preference” is implicit in the frequent use of the term “racial 
preference” in the language of the most notable and recent 
Equal Protection cases, where it is semantically interchangeable 
with the term “racial classification.” The semantic 
interchangeability of the terms “racial classification” and 
“racial preference” is apparent not only from a reading of 
those cases, but also in the high frequency with which the 
Court used the latter term in those cases. In Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co.—a case that involved the constitutionality of an 
affirmative action program requiring the government to prefer 
contracts with minority-owned businesses—the Court refers to 
“preferences” of a racial nature twenty-nine times.71 In 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, another government 
contracting case, the Court mentions racial “preferences” 
thirty-six times,72 followed by eighteen times in Grutter.73 
 
 67 Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 68 Id. at 16. 
 69 Id. at 13–14. 
 70 Id. at 16 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226–27; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). 
 71 Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
 72 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200. 
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Moreover, the Court often uses the term “racial preference” to 
define the trigger for strict scrutiny.74 
Although a racial classification is identical to a racial 
preference in an affirmative action context, “racial 
classification” must have a more expansive definition, for in 
some cases, racial classifications exist even when there is no 
unequal distribution of benefits or burdens. In Johnson v. 
California, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to a 
policy that automatically segregated prisoners by race in order 
to avoid racially-motivated gang violence.75 The Court has also 
held in Shaw v. Reno that blatant gerrymandering to create 
majority-minority voting districts warranted strict scrutiny 
review.76 
Even though these cases did not involve “preferences,” they 
were still subject to strict scrutiny review because, like 
preferences, the government actions in these cases were based 
solely upon racial assumptions, stigma, and stereotypes; the 
government took these actions without consideration of the 
individuality of those affected. In Johnson, for example, the 
Court wrote that what made the racial separation of prisoners 
suspect for Equal Protection violation was the use of “race as a 
proxy for gang membership and violence” without any 
individualized assessment of the prisoner or the facility.77 
Similarly, in Shaw, the Court wrote that racial classifications 
threaten “to stigmatize individuals by reason of their 
membership in a racial group,”78 noting that race-based 
gerrymandering perpetuated “stereotypical notions about 
members of the same racial group—that they think alike, share 
the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates.”79 
That a racial classification amounts to some unwarranted 
assumption about a person based solely on race is eminently 
 
 73 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 74 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223 (“[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination.” (quoting Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (emphasis added))). 
 75 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 499–501 (2005). 
 76 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993). 
 77 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 518, 521. Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1990) (“Race 
cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence.”). 
 78 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. 
 79 Id. at 631. 
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clear in college admissions cases, too, where the Court cites as 
its main constitutional concern applicants’ individualized 
review.80 
In a similar vein, it is important to note that in order for a 
racial classification to exist, the government must take a 
discrete action based solely on race. This is evident in the very 
language of the cases. In Bakke, for example, the Court wrote, 
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry 
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”81 The 
affirmative action and college admissions cases have made it 
clear that a racial classification exists where a government 
action occurs solely because of race but not when race is simply 
acknowledged in a more complex, openly competitive process.82 
Given this body of case law, the University of Texas does 
not employ “racial classifications” subject to strict scrutiny 
review. As discussed at length in Part II, the University’s 
consideration of race is not a preference and is not tied to 
automatic assumptions about the applicant based solely on race. 
More fundamentally, the University takes no discrete action 
based solely upon race. Admissions officers give no award of 
admission or even an award of a particular number of points 
based on race alone. Any deference given to a student is not 
based solely on his race, but on race in the context of other 
relevant socio-economic indicators that demonstrate personal 
merits not reflected in a purely academic profile.83 
 
 80 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003). 
 81 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290–91 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 
100 (1943) (emphasis added)); see also id. at 305 (citing McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 
339 U.S. 637, 641–42 (1950)) (“When a classification denies an individual opportunities or 
benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be 
regarded as suspect.” (emphasis added)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 493 (1989) (“The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete 
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.” (emphasis 
added)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 262 (1995) (“Such review 
prevents ineligible firms from taking part in the program solely because of their 
minority ownership.” (emphasis added)); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003) 
(finding it unconstitutional to award a minority applicant twenty points “solely 
because of race” (emphasis added)). 
 82 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
 83 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 223 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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B. “Racial Classifications” Where There is a Risk of Race 
Becoming a Predominant Factor in a Decision 
Defining “racial classifications” as racial preferences or 
discrete acts based solely on race would cause some tension 
with Grutter. Grutter unquestioningly assumed that racial 
classifications existed at Michigan Law School even though 
their admissions program did not employ preferences based 
solely on race. In fact, the Court upheld the admissions 
program because the decision to admit or deny was not based 
solely on race. A slightly wider definition of “racial 
classifications” could keep the assumption of racial preferences 
in Grutter consistent with a finding of no racial classifications 
in Fisher. 
Principles espoused in the voting redistricting cases that 
followed the 1990 census strongly indicate that racial 
classifications do not exist unless race forms the predominant 
basis upon which the government takes a discrete action. 
Summarizing prior case holdings, Justice O’Connor wrote in 
Bush v. Vera, 
Strict scrutiny applies where . . . “race for its own sake, and 
not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant 
and controlling rationale in drawing its  district lines’ and ‘the 
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
 principles . . . to racial considerations.” Strict scrutiny does 
not apply merely because redistricting is performed with 
consciousness of race.84 
Essentially, this holding means that race-consciousness 
alone is not evidence of a racial classification. A racial 
classification cannot exist unless racial considerations dominate 
a  decision-making process. 
In order to accommodate the assumption of racial 
classifications in Grutter, however, the definition would have 
to be expanded further to include not just instances where race 
dominates a decision-making process, but where there is a risk 
that race could dominate. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter 
noted that there was a substantial risk that race would 
dominate the decisions about who would fill the last fifteen 
 
 84 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 
(1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995)) (internal citations omitted). 
334               B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2013 
 
to twenty percent of seats of the incoming class at Michigan 
Law School. Because admissions officials could inflate the size 
of the “plus” given to race in order to meet diversity goals, race 
could become the predominant factor in those late-season 
decisions.85 The risk of some race-dominated decisions at 
Michigan Law School makes it potentially subject to Equal 
Protection violation, thus warranting a finding that the law 
school used racial classifications. 
The University of Texas took Justice Kennedy’s dissent 
seriously and completely eliminated the risk of any single 
admissions decision being racially dominated by numerically 
confining the role that race can play in any one decision and 
by not keeping track of the racial composition of its incoming 
class during the admissions season.86 
A definition of “racial classification” that narrows it to 
discrete government actions based predominantly on race 
would be almost entirely consistent with previous case law and 
would give universities some repose with respect to their race-
conscious admissions decisions. It is an argument that will not 
be considered in Fisher, but which perhaps may be considered 
in a future battle over race-conscious admissions. 
IV. THE UNIVERSITY HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN A 
TRANSPARENT ADMISSIONS PROCESS 
The University of Texas also did not argue that the Court 
should recognize that the University’s use of race is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling interest in a transparent 
admission process. This interest is inherent in Court precedent 
on academic freedom.87 
The finding in Bakke that a university has a compelling 
 
 85 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389–92 (“Without a sufficiently high AI and well-written 
essays, an applicant with even the highest personal achievement score will still be 
denied admission.”). 
 86 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 236. 
 87 See Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom 
and the Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 125, 126-146 (2009) and Amy H. Candido, Comment, A Right to Talk Dirty?: 
Academic Freedom Values and Sexual Harassment in the University Classroom, 4 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 85, 86 (1997) for general discussions of the connection 
between academic freedom and the First Amendment. See also Erica Goldberg & Kelly 
Sarabyn, Measuring A “Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in A 
Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 239 (2011). 
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interest in creating campus diversity is rooted in First 
Amendment rights to academic freedom.88 Universities have 
the freedom to make their own “judgments as to education,” 
including “the selection of its student body.”89 This is one of 
the “four essential freedoms” of a university—”to determine 
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study.”90 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor’s decision to hold 
Michigan Law School’s use of race constitutional was rooted 
in this right.91 If universities have a compelling interest rooted 
in the First Amendment to select their own student bodies, 
then it follows that the University of Texas has a compelling 
interest in obtaining a complete and transparent picture of its 
applicants. This simply cannot happen unless the students can 
report their race in their application. 
Racial classifications are traditionally held suspect because 
race is so frequently irrelevant to achieving a legitimate 
government interest.92 The Court has conceded, however, that 
race may be relevant in two instances. First, race may be 
relevant where the government has an interest in “eliminating 
the pernicious vestiges of past discrimination.”93 Second, in 
Grutter, the Court held that race was relevant to the 
compelling interest of creating campus diversity.94 
Race is also relevant to a transparent admission process. 
Universities seek more in their student bodies than the most 
academically qualified students.95 They also seek personal 
 
 88 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 89 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. 
 90 Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in result)). 
 91 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003) (“Our holding today is in 
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic 
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”). 
 92 See, e.g.,Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986); Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) 
(stating that strict scrutiny has been rooted in the unfairness of considering an 
“immutable characteristic unrelated to a person’s ability to perform or contribute to 
society.”). 
 93 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301. 
 94 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–33. 
 95 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (noting that a diverse student body is essential to 
the exchange of ideas). 
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qualities that indicate a potential for contribution or success 
that cannot be reflected solely in academic terms.96 While race 
alone does not bespeak any potential for contribution or 
success, it is a relevant factor because it can be an important 
part of the applicant’s identity and personal history.97 A 
person’s racial identity can communicate important personal 
qualities to an admissions official, and the benefit is not 
limited to underprivileged minorities.98 As the District Court 
and Fifth Circuit noted in Fisher, an applicant who takes an 
active leadership role in his community would not be 
evaluated in the same way as a white student who takes an 
active leadership role in a predominantly Hispanic 
community.99 If a university cannot actively inquire into the 
racial identity of candidates, the social nuances of racial 
identity, which may indicate special qualities in certain 
candidates, will be lost. This loss constitutes a serious 
infringement of a university’s First Amendment right to make 
informed choices about who will study at its institution. This 
loss substantially outweighs the questionable harms that the 
petitioner alleges befall non-minority candidates under the 
University of Texas’ admissions process.100 
To the extent that the petitioner or her amici may argue 
that the consideration of race permits admission officials to 
perpetuate stereotypes about low minority ability, that 
argument is fundamentally flawed for three reasons. First, 
officially eliminating the consideration of race alone will not 
prevent admissions officials from making race-influenced 
judgments. Second, the undue level of opacity that comes with 
eliminating race from applications can result in mistaken 
judgments on the part of admissions officials. Third, making 
 
 96 Id. at 317 (“Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique 
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a 
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other 
qualifications deemed important.”). 
 97 Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making 
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 900 (1995) (stating that race 
has the power to “shape our vision of the world and of ourselves.”). 
 98 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003) (noting that the University of 
Michigan’s Law School admission process did not “unduly harm nonminority 
applicants.”). 
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the admissions process entirely race-blind is itself a harm that is 
worse than a measured consideration of race. 
Even if candidates do not report race, the race of 
candidates is often evident from names and addresses. An 
admission official is likely to assume that a candidate named 
Oscar Salazar from the Rio Grande Valley is Hispanic and 
probably Mexican, and that assumption may trigger an 
admissions official’s sympathies or prejudices towards 
Mexican-American applicants as he holistically evaluates the 
applicant’s merits. Even more importantly, racial assumptions 
based on last names and addresses could be entirely wrong. 
Oscar Salazar from the Rio Grande Valley who has taken an 
active role in the immigrants’ rights movement could be a 
fourth-generation Texan with one Hispanic great-great-
grandparent. Schools should be allowed to inquire into a 
candidate’s race in order to eliminate the level of opaqueness 
that a completely race-blind process would create. 
Lastly, even if there is a risk that consideration of race in 
the context of academic achievement has a potential to 
perpetuate an expectation of lower minority academic 
achievement, making the process race-blind plays into an 
equally, if not more shameful history of failing “to confront 
the complexity of the issue in a candid and critical manner.”101 
There is substantial evidence that key indicators of academic 
success, namely standardized tests, have built-in racial 
prejudices.102 Pretending that this pervasive, if unintentional, 
prejudice does not exist is more harmful than engaging in it. 
Even if the studies indicating that standardized tests prejudice 
minority students have been subject to doubt, the Court’s 
decision to take a side in that debate would require it to make 
“complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily 
within the expertise of the university.”103 The obvious 
 
 101 CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 2 (1993). 
 102 See William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-in 
Headwinds”: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 131, 139 (2002) (citing Grutter, 288 F.3d 732); see also Claude Steele & 
Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African 
Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995); Amicus Brief of The College 
Board and The National School Boards Ass’n at 22 (framing the issue as the SAT only 
being a single, imperfect predictor of academic success and criterion in who should be 
admitted to a university). 
 103 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 at 328. 
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compromise between the two concerns is the one that has been 
in play since Bakke was decided in 1978—to permit a holistic 
evaluation of a candidate’s race in the context of all other 
relevant factors. 
Depriving universities of the right to consider the race of 
candidates creates an unnecessary and detrimental layer of 
opaqueness in the admissions process. If universities have a 
compelling interest in choosing who will attend, then they 
should be able to transparently learn the race of their 
candidates and how this racial identity has influenced their 
lives. There is no race-neutral way to accomplish this goal, and 
so the University of Texas’ race-conscious process is narrowly 
tailored to the compelling interest in a transparent admissions 
process.104 
V. THE COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT STRICT SCRUTINY 
WITH DEFERENCE AS APPLIED IN GRUTTER IS APPROPRIATE 
BECAUSE EQUAL PROTECTION SCRUTINY IS FLEXIBLE AND 
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE 
In his concurring Fifth Circuit opinion in Fisher, Judge 
Garza called into question whether any race-conscious 
admissions standard could ever withstand strict scrutiny.105 
While Judge Garza conceded that the Fifth Circuit 
appropriately applied the standard from Grutter, he criticized 
Grutter for applying “a standard markedly less demanding” 
than strict scrutiny.106 This may be the issue that the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in order to evaluate, and it calls for an 
argument about the meaning of strict scrutiny itself. 
Judge Garza may be right that no race-conscious program 
could ever withstand “strict scrutiny” in its “most exacting” 
form, but he overlooks the fact that the three-tiered scrutiny 
system is flexible to context.107 During the 1970s, 1980s, and 
 
 104 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989) (requiring 
consideration of race-neutral alternatives before finding that a racial classification is 
narrowly tailored); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339  (“Narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”). 
 105 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., 
concurring) (“To be specific, race now matters in university admissions, where, if strict 
scrutiny where properly applied, it should not.”). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
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1990s, for example, the Court developed what observers have 
called “rational basis with bite” for traditionally non-suspect 
classifications.108 In several notable cases, such as City of 
Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,109 U. S. Department 
of Agriculture v. Moreno,110 and Romer v. Evans,111 the Court 
subjected traditionally non-suspect classifications (disability, 
co-habitant status, and sexual orientation, respectively) to 
heightened scrutiny even though it never formally departed 
from “rational basis review.” In these cases, the Court 
functionally departed from the “usual deference associated 
with rational basis review” because the legislation at issue “was 
in fact intended to further an improper government 
objective.”112 
Likewise, Bakke and Grutter have clearly carved out a 
relaxed form of strict scrutiny that is appropriate to the 
particular context of college admissions. Both cases stated that 
some level of deference should be afforded to colleges given 
the tradition of academic freedom and the fact that college 
admissions involve “complex educational judgments in an area 
that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.”113 
Even if this means that a university is able to escape the 
strictest application of judicial scrutiny, it is appropriate given 
this special context, especially where non-minority applicants 
suffer no substantial harm.114 Although this particular level of 
deference may depart from the strictest form of strict scrutiny, 
like “rational basis with bite,” the relaxed version of strict 
scrutiny sanctioned in Bakke and applied in Grutter is proper 
given that the use of race does not spring from an improper 
motive, as it furthers a compelling state interest, does not 
unduly harm non-minorities, and has been used to further 
appropriate ends for university admissions programs since the 
 
REV. 481 (2004). 
 108 Am. Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 692 
(6th Cir. 2011) (citing Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV.  L. REV. 
747, 759–60 (2011)). 
 109 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 110 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 111 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 112 Am. Express, 641 F.3d at 692. 
 113 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
 114 Id. at 309. 
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1970s. 
As Justice O’Connor wrote in Grutter, “context matters” in 
Equal Protection cases.115 In Adarand, the Court “made clear 
that strict scrutiny must take ‘relevant differences’ into 
account.”116 Taking a close look at context is the “fundamental 
purpose” of strict scrutiny itself.117 To subject racial awareness 
in the college admissions process to the same level of scrutiny 
as miscegenation laws is a patent absurdity.118 If the Court is to 
adhere to the label “strict scrutiny,” then there is very good 
reason to nevertheless permit the application of “good faith 
deference” granted by Bakke and Grutter. Otherwise, there 
would be no place for race in the college admissions process.119 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given how tightly the University of Texas’ race-conscious 
admissions program adheres to the standard of Grutter, it is 
hard to believe that the Supreme Court would have granted 
certiorari unless it was considering a modification of the 
Grutter standard. The University of Texas has met the 
challenge with an appeal to stare decisis interests. It is a good 
argument, but perhaps not powerful enough to overcome what 
could be a very probing inquiry into the meaning of strict 
scrutiny of racial classifications. Should the Court’s decision 
fail to completely and permanently resolve all doubts about 
the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions, more 
fundamental arguments about the very meaning of strict 
scrutiny might be used to a university’s advantage in future 
litigation. 
 
 
 115 Id. at 308 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343–344 (1960)). 
 116 Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)). 
  117 Id. 
 118 Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that a law against 
interracial marriage had “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious 
racial discrimination”) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) 
(finding a compelling state interest in the creation of a diverse campus that can be 
served through race-conscious admissions). 
 119 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–319); see also Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011). 
